Hybrid Warfare vs New Generation Warfare

The term "Hybrid Warfare" was initially proposed by Frank Hoffman and gained prominence following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses the term to describe the strategic approach employed by Russia in Crimea. Hoffman's concept of hybrid strategy is based on the use of a mix of instruments designed to obscure the situation for the adversary, making it difficult to organize an effective counter-strategy. This strategy is multimodal, employing technologies and methods appropriate to the state's or non-state actor's capabilities. This includes supporting insurgents, terrorists, and criminal activities, as well as using sophisticated technologies combined with terrorism and cyber warfare against economic and financial targets.

Hybrid warfare is not unique to Russia; other nations like Iran also employ it. For instance, Iran has provided weapons, support, and training to various militant groups, such as the al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain and the Houthi militants in Yemen, as well as to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups (US STATE DEPARTMENT, 2019).

On the other hand, some critics, argue that Hoffman's concept is too vague and often used generically to refer to irregular warfare against a superior conventional force. Berzins (2019) contrasts this with the Russian concept of New Generation Warfare, which is more precise and targeted, addressing some criticisms of Hoffman's hybrid warfare. The Russian approach focuses on psychological and information warfare, aiming to minimize the need for conventional military power by gaining support from the opponent's civilian and military population.

Russian military thinkers emphasize the idea of permanent warfare and a constant enemy, primarily NATO. This view reflects a long-standing geopolitical conflict where NATO represents not just a military alliance but also Western civilization and its values. The Russian strategy of New Generation Warfare, as outlined by Chekinov and Bogadanov, includes eight phases, from non-military asymmetric warfare to full-scale military operations, highlighting the role of disinformation and non-military measures in modern conflict.

#### Phases of New Generation Warfare (Chekinov & Bogadanov, 2013):

1. Non-military asymmetric warfare, including information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures.

2. Special operations to mislead political and military leaders through coordinated measures by diplomatic channels, media, and government agencies.

3. Intimidation, deception, and bribery of government and military officers.

4. Destabilizing propaganda to increase public discontent, supported by militant groups.

5. Establishment of no-fly zones, blockades, and use of private military companies.

6. Commencement of military action, preceded by reconnaissance and subversive missions.

7. Combination of information operations, electronic warfare, aerospace operations, and use of high-precision weapons.

8. Final elimination of resistance through special operations and advanced weaponry.

The Russian doctrine of New Generation Warfare underscores the importance of disinformation, obfuscation, and the use of non-symmetrical and often non-military means in strategic planning.

However, the War in Ukraine showed that when these "irregular" ways of war are not enough to defeat a motivated enemy even more so when the attacking party massively overestimates its own capabilities and the attitude of its opponent. The classic way of war showed why it is timeless through the massive emplyment of artillery, armour, air power and the simple and quality that mass of numbers have in a war.